Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971 by Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. & Norton, Richard J.
Naval War College Review
Volume 69
Number 2 Spring Article 18
2016
Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War
Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs,
1967–1971
Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Richard J. Norton
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. and Norton, Richard J. (2016) "Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed
Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971," Naval War College Review: Vol. 69 : No. 2 , Article 18.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/18
 1 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Today’s headlines are filled with discus-
sions questioning the ethics of launching 
unmanned weapons (drones) against 
targets when nearby innocent civilians 
might be killed or injured by an attack. 
It is interesting to reflect on the ethical 
ramifications of launching thousands 
of unmanned weapons (the fu-go bal-
loons) against an entire continent, with 
no ability to predict within thousands 
of miles where the weapons would 
strike or who would be injured or killed. 
Such attacks today would certainly 
violate the law of armed conflict, but 
they must be judged within the con-
text of warfare in the last century.
I strongly recommend this book to 
those with an interest in the tech-
nology of warfare, and to those 
who may have heard of the balloon 
bomb attacks and thought them 
to be almost-mythical events.
JOHN E. JACKSON
Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War 
Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–
1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages. 
$10.94.
Few states in modern times have seen 
their military beaten as badly as Egypt 
did in 1967—and have that military 
survive. Even fewer, perhaps no oth-
ers, have then deliberately rebuilt that 
defeated force to a point at which a 
mere five years later it could again offer 
battle and, arguably, produce victory. 
How the Egyptians accomplished this 
has been something of an incomplete 
and little-known story up to now. This is 
mainly due to a lack of translated articles 
and writings penned by senior Egyptian 
leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has, 
with this volume, begun to fill in some 
of the major gaps in the account.
Aboul-Enein’s book is actually a col-
lection of articles initially published 
in Infantry magazine. Each of the 
original accounts was written by General 
Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked 
by Nasser to build the defeated and 
demoralized Egyptian forces into a 
professional, combined-arms military 
that could retake and hold occupied 
Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war 
minister for both Nasser and Sadat and 
was the master architect of the stunning-
ly successful creation of professionalism 
in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice, 
despite whatever biases and personal 
axes to grind he may bring to the table, 
deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein’s 
translation gives Fawzi that opportunity.
Fawzi’s challenge was massive. The pre-
Fawzi army was much more involved 
with state security than with power 
projection or war fighting. As the 1967 
war had revealed, the Egyptian armed 
forces, even with Soviet equipment, 
were woefully inferior technologically 
to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was 
riddled with low morale and displayed 
an apparently well-deserved inferior-
ity complex. Its soldiery was, for the 
most part, uneducated and poorly 
trained. The Egyptian high command 
was overcentralized, overpoliticized, 
and, as events had proved, unable to 
exercise anything like the command and 
control required in modern combat. 
The end of the war both left Israel with 
strategic depth and turned the Suez 
Canal into a natural defensive barrier 
that was further fortified with a series 
of formidable defensive positions.
Fawzi admits to having certain un-
usual advantages in accomplishing his 
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mission� Nasser was willing to give his 
new war minister as close to a blank 
check as could be imagined� Nothing 
was more important than securing a 
victory and expunging the shame of 
1967� Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
became a guaranteed supplier of 
military hardware, not only making 
up the quantitative Egyptian losses but 
substantially improving equipment 
quality as well� Fawzi makes the point 
that the Soviets were less motivated by 
a common ideology in this effort than 
by the need to prove that their equip-
ment was at least on a par with that of 
the United States, and to maintain their 
geopolitical position in the region� Fawzi 
also confirms that the Soviet presence 
on the ground was extensive, that Soviet 
forces not only advised but performed 
certain military duties as well�
Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt 
and improved others� Surface-launched 
ship-to-ship missiles, modern surface-
to-air missile batteries, new armor 
and aircraft all entered the Egyptian 
inventory� Fawzi understood, how-
ever, that new hardware would not be 
enough� Military-school attendance was 
increased, and the military’s intellec-
tual capabilities expanded� But beyond 
that, he explains, the three-year “war 
of attrition” that Egypt waged against 
Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort 
to blood the Egyptian army, test new 
tactics, and deploy new forces� Over this 
period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces 
came to embrace a defensive mind-set, 
while the Egyptian army became 
imbued with the spirit of the offensive� 
Although most books claim Israel won 
the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this 
was not the case� According to Fawzi, 
not only did Israeli jets increasingly 
avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian 
soldiers underwent quantum improve-
ments as well—and these improvements 
were the real war aims of this period� 
It is also clear that whatever strategic 
deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they 
might have against the Egyptians did 
not work when it came to preventing at 
least a limited war� As the Egyptian army 
began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his 
officers crafted plans for what would 
become one of the most successful set-
piece battles of the twentieth century: 
the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal 
and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line�
Reproducing the Infantry articles, com-
plete with their original and somewhat 
repetitive forewords, gives the book 
something of a choppy feel� It is also 
clear that this work is a synopsis of 
Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete transla-
tion� Some readers will be left with a 
desire to know more� Not surprisingly, 
the focus of the book tends to be at 
the strategic level� Readers who want 
more tactical details will have to find 
them elsewhere� Unfortunately for our 
understanding of Egyptian perspectives 
of how the war was waged, Fawzi was re-
lieved of his duties two years before the 
war began and was arrested for conspir-
ing to overthrow Sadat, so this critical 
element is sadly lacking� However, these 
shortcomings pale when compared 
with the value inherent in this work�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military, 
by George E� Reed� Lincoln, Neb�: Potomac 
Books, 2015� 216 pages� $26�50�
Although the term “toxic leadership” has 
recently come into vogue, the U�S� mili-
tary is no stranger to the phenomenon� 
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